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I. INTRODUCTION
"If you drink too much and drive, the least you lose is your license,
guaranteed."' Under this battle cry, the Nebraska Unicameral Legis-
Copyright held by NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
* The author gratefully acknowledges the advice and guidance of Paul Potadle,
Assistant Attorney General for the State of Nebraska.
1. Public Hearing on LB 291 Before the Committee on Transportation, Ninety-Sec-
ond Legislature, 1st Sess. 42 (1991) [Hereinafter Public Hearing] (Statement of
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lature enacted LB 291.2 When the new law took effect on January 1,
1993, Nebraska joined thirty-one other states3 in implementing a com-
plete system of administrative license revocation. Administrative li-
cense revocation (hereinafter ALR), also referred to as
"administrative per se" or "summary suspension," establishes an ad-
ministrative process, independent of the criminal justice system,
whereby the driving privileges of an intoxicated motorist may be im-
mediately revoked. Under the ALR scheme, law enforcement of-
ficers, as agents of the Department of Motor Vehicles, are authorized
to seize the driver's license of a motorist who either fails a chemical
test or who refuses to submit to a chemical test.4 Upon seizure, the
motorist receives a temporary license valid for only a short period of
Senator Emil Beyer, Principal Introducer)(quoting Oregon's Traffic Safety
Commission).
2. LB 291, 1992 Neb. Laws 125-49, was signed by Governor Nelson on April 17, 1992,
and took effect on January 1, 1993. The bill was first introduced in 1991 and re-
ferred to the Committee on Transportation. A public hearing was held on the bill
on February 12, 1991. The measure remained in committee for the duration of
1991 while an interim study (LR 84, NEBRAsKA LAW AND THE IMPAIRED DRIVER
AN OvERVIEw, REPORT OF THE COMMFI-rEE ON TRANSPORTATION OF THE NE-
BRASKA LEGISLATURE, Ninety-Second Legislature, 1st Sess. (1991)) was com-
pleted. The bill was reintroduced as LB 291 in 1992 and subsequently passed by
the Legislature. The provisions amended by the bill are codified as amended at
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-106; 28-306; 39-603; 39-669.07; 39-669.08; 39-669.09; 39-669.11;
39-669.12; 39-669.14 to 39-669.17; 39-669.39; 39-6,104.08; 39-6,122; 60-498; 60-4118; 60-
4,129; 71-1,103 (Cum. Supp. 1992).
3. Alaska, ALAsKA STAT. §§ 28.15.165-166 (Supp. 1992); Arizona, ARIM. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 28-691 (Supp. 1991); California, CAL. VEH. CODE § 13353, 13353.2 to .4
(West Supp. 1992); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-2-122.1 (Supp. 1992); Connect-
icut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-227b (West Supp. 1992); Delaware, DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 21, § 2740-50 (1985); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 322.261 to .2615 (West
Supp. 1992); Hawaii, HAw. REV. STAT. § 286-251 to -266 (Supp. 1991); Illinois, ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 95§, para. 11-501.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992); Indiana, IND. CODE
ANN. § 9-30-6-8 to -9 (Burns Supp. 1991); Iowa, IowA CODE ANN. § 321J.9, 321J.12
(West Supp. 1992); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-1002 (1991); Louisiana, LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 32:667 to :669 (West 1989 & Supp. 1992); Maine, ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 29 § 1311-A (West Supp. 1991); Maryland, MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 16-
205.1 (1992); Michigan, MicH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 257.625g (West Supp. 1992);
Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 169.123 (West 1986 & Supp. 1992); Mississippi,
MLss. CODE ANN. § 63-11-21, 63-11-23 (Supp. 1992); Missouri, Mo. ANN. STAT.
§§ 302.500 to .540 (Vernon Supp. 1992); Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 484.385-387
(1991); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-111, -111.1, -112 (Michie Supp. 1992);
North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16.5 (Supp. 1991); North Dakota, N.D. CENT.
CODE §§ 39-20-03.01, 39-20-05 (Supp. 1991); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.191
to .193 (Anderson Supp. 1991); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 754 (West
Supp. 1992); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. § 813.410 (1991); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 41-2-130 (Supp. 1992); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 § 1205 (Supp. 1992); West
Virginia, W.VA. CODE §§ 17C-5A-1 to -4 (1991 Supp. 1992); Wisconsin, WIs. STAT.
ANN. § 343.305 (West 1991 & Supp. 1992); Wyoming, Wyo. STAT. §§ 31-6-102 to 104
(1989).
4. MODEL REVOCATION ON ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATION (ROAD) LAw§ 5, re-
printed in, NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPART-
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time and is given an opportunity to appeal the revocation with the
Department of Motor Vehicles.5
The ostensible purpose of the move to ALR was to deter persons
from driving under the influence of alcohol by providing a "swift and
certain" method for administratively revoking the driving privileges
of persons who fail or refuse a chemical test.6 Under the previous law,
it often took from six to ten months for the license revocation process
(criminal and/or administrative) to be completed.7 Under the new
statutory scheme, administrative revocation is to be completed within
approximately thirty days.
Evidence from other states supports the fact that ALR is effective
as a deterrent. Many states that have enacted an ALR scheme have
seen a drop of five to ten percent in the number of alcohol-related
traffic fatalities.8 Beyond the obvious social benefit of saving lives,
there is evidence that ALR results in an overall economic benefit to
society. A study by the U.S. Department of Transportation found that
as a result of the implementation of ALR in Nevada, Mississippi, and
Illinois, the citizens of those states avoided literally tens of millions of
dollars in costs associated with nighttime accidents. 9
Lest we give too much credit to state legislators for their vision and
initiative, it is important to note that the federal government is the
driving force behind the nationwide move to ALR. Using the carrot-
and-stick approach of "incentive funding," Congress has authorized
basic and supplemental grants to those states that implement a pre-
scribed number of measures such as ALR to combat drunk driving and
promote highway safety.1O Nebraska took a major step toward quali-
MENT OF TRANSPORTATION, REDUCING HIGHWAY CRASHES THROUGH
ADMINISTRATIVE LICENSE REVOCATION 27, 30-31 (1986).
5. Id. §§ 5, 9 at 30-31, 36-37.
6. LB 291 § 9(1); NEB. REV. STAT. 39-669.15(1)(Cum. Supp. 1992).
7. Public Hearing, supra note 1, at 65 (Statement of Fred Zwonechek, Administra-
tor, Nebraska Office of Highway Safety, Department of Motor Vehicles).
8. LR 84, NEBRASKA LAW AND THE IMPAIRED DRIVER: AN OvERvIEw, REPORT OF
THE COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION OF THE NEBRASKA LEGISLATURE, Ninety-
Second Legislature, 1st Sess., at 97-113 (1991). See also H. Laurence Ross, Admin-
istrative License Revocation in New Mexico: An Evaluation, 9 LAW & POL'Y 5,
13-14 (1987).
9. JOHN H. LACEY, ET AL., COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LICENSE
SUSPENSIONS, NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DE-
PARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION iX (1991)(Executive Summary of Report No.
DOT HS 807 689).
10. Since 1983, the Secretary of Transportation has offered basic and supplemental
grants to states which meet a number of criteria as set forth in 23 U.S.C. § 408
(1988). Funds available through § 408 may be received by states in no more than
five fiscal years and may not exceed a specified percentage of the costs to imple-
ment the state's alcohol traffic safety program. For a detailed discussion of Ne-
braska's eligibility for such funds, see LR 84, supra note 8, at 68-76.
Also, in light of the fact that some states are no longer eligible for § 408 funds,
[Vol. 72:296
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fying for such grants with the passage of LB 291. If the Secretary of
Transportation determines that compliance is complete, Nebraska
could be eligible for grants totaling more than $500,000 in the first fis-
cal year under ALR.11
Given the federal incentives and evidence of the lives saved by
ALR in other states, it appears that the action of the Nebraska Legis-
lature was appropriate. That is not to say, however, that the move to
ALR will be simple. There are immediate and tangible obstacles to its
implementation that must be taken seriously. The most obvious ob-
stacle is the strain that ALR will place on the administrative resources
of the Department of Motor Vehicles. In other states, ALR has re-
sulted in literally thousands of appeals, necessitating more hearing of-
ficers, more state lawyers, and more of all the resources necessary to
conduct such proceedings.12 Administrative officials face the uncer-
tainty of applying a new law and implementing the new procedures
that accompany it. In addition, ALR places a significant burden on
law enforcement officers who must deal with additional paperwork
and hearing appearances. Imposing such a burden may dampen the
enthusiasm of the very individuals upon whom the success of ALR
depends.13 Ironically, because administrative revocation orders are
appealable in district court, ALR may also add to the congestion in the
court system it seeks to avoid.14
With an eye toward alleviating some of the difficulties involved in
Congress recently enacted a new program of this type to run from 1993 through
1997. 23 U.S.C.A. § 410(j)(West Supp. 1992). The § 410 program provides basic
and supplemental grants based on states' implementation of highway safety pro-
grams such as an expedited driver's license suspension or revocation system, a
plan to reduce the legal blood alcohol level to .08 percent, a statewide program of
roadside sobriety checkpoints, a statutory scheme aimed at preventing minors
from driving under the influence, open container laws, and a system whereby
persons convicted of driving under the influence are subject to suspension of their
vehicle registration and surrender of their license plates. Id. § 410(a)-(e). Under
the program, if a state is not eligible in a given fiscal year, the funds apportioned
to that state are reapportioned among the qualifying states. Id. § 410(g).
11. LR 84, supra note 8, at 71. See also Public Hearing, supra note 1, at 66 (State-
ment of Fred Zwonechek, Administrator, Nebraska Office of Highway Safety,
Department of Motor Vehicles).
12. LR 84, supra note 8, at 95-96. See also James Latchaw, Overcoming Problems and
Costs of Administrative Hearings, in NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY AD-
MINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, REDUCING HIGmvAY
CRASHES THROUGH AMImIIsTRATIVE LICENSE REVOCATION 73 (1986).
13. In a study conducted in New Mexico, one commentator noted a negative reaction
to ALR among law enforcement officers and among members of the judiciary.
Ross, supra note 8, at 9-11.
14. The Nebraska ALR statutes do not exempt Department of Motor Vehicles deci-
sions from the Administrative Procedure Act. Under NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-917
(Cum. Supp. 1992), a person aggrieved by the decision of a state agency may ap-
peal that decision in district court. The number of revocation orders which are
ultimately challenged in district court will likely depend on the willingness of
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the transition to ALR, this Note will examine the administrative por-
tion of Nebraska's drunk driving laws.15 To that end, the following
sections trace the development of drunk driving law in Nebraska, ex-
plore the issues that may be raised under the new ALR scheme, and
look forward to the direction that Nebraska drunk driving law may
take in the future.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF DRUNK DRIVING LAW IN
NEBRASKA
Nebraska's attempt to protect society from the drunk driver began
in 1911 when the Legislature made it a misdemeanor for "any person
under sixteen years of age or for an intoxicated person to operate a
motor vehicle."'16 The advent of the chemical test came in 1949, when
a statute was enacted that provided for the creation of presumptions
regarding intoxication based upon the chemical analysis of an individ-
ual's blood, spinal fluid, or urine.17 Under the law, however, an alco-
hol concentration of .15 percent or greater gave rise only to a
rebuttable presumption that the individual was under the influence of
alcohol and specifically provided that guilt could not be inferred from
refusal to submit to a test.1 8
Administrative involvement in the realm of DWI law began in 1959
with the introduction of implied consent and administrative revoca-
tion for refusals.' 9 Under the law, every person operating a motor ve-
hicle on a public highway was deemed to have given his or her consent
to submit to a chemical test.2 0 Any person refusing to submit to a
chemical test could have his or her license revoked by the Director of
the Department of Motor Vehicles after a proper administrative
hearing.2 1
The last major evolutionary step in Nebraska law in this area oc-
curred in 1971.22 In that year, a bill was passed which repealed the
judges to grant or deny temporary stays. See infra text accompanying notes 162-
63.
15. To the extent that they do not impact the administrative revocation process, this
Note does not address issues relating to criminal prosecutions for driving while
intoxicated. Nor does this Note examine Nebraska's drunk driving statutes as
they relate to the commercial driver. The following sections focus solely on the
administrative revocation process as it relates to ordinary motor vehicle
operators.
16. Chap. 115 § 6, 1911 Neb. Laws 398, 400. Legislation prior to this time was directed
at persons operating carriages. See Act of March 1, 1879, §§ 61-62, 1879 Neb. Laws
120, 133-34.
17. Chap. 116, LB 88 § 2, 1949 Neb. Laws 309, 311-12.
18. Id.
19. Chap. 168, LB 694, 1959 Neb. Laws 613.
20. Id. at § 1, 1959 Neb. Laws at 613.
21. Id. at § 7, 1959 Neb. Laws at 614-15.
22. LB 948, 1971 Neb. Laws.
[Vol. 72:296
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scheme of statutory presumptions based upon chemical test results
and created a scheme of per se violations. Simply having a .10 percent
alcohol concentration in one's body fluid became a per se violation of
the law.23 As such, the chemical test became even more the center-
piece of drunk driving litigation.
Legislation between 1971 and 1991 made only minor changes to the
drunk driving statutes. During that period, the Legislature focused
primarily on increasing the penalties for driving under the influence
and sought to fine-tune the provisions of the per se scheme in reaction
to various decisions of the Nebraska Supreme Court.2 4
As such, on the eve of the transition to ALR, the role of the De-
partment of Motor Vehicles in drunk driving cases was relatively lim-
ited. Prior to January 1, 1993, a motorist arrested on suspicion of
driving while intoxicated was subject to administrative revocation
only if he or she refused to submit to a chemical test.25 Upon such a
refusal, the motorist retained his or her driving privileges until a hear-
ing was conducted and the Director of the Department of Motor Vehi-
cles made a formal determination that the refusal was unreasonable.26
If the motorist consented to a test and failed, any subsequent license
revocation was the result of a criminal conviction for driving while
intoxicated without administrative involvement.27 Under LB 291, the
role of the Department of Motor Vehicles will be anything but limited.
III. LB 291: EXPANDING THE ADMINISTRATIVE ROLE
LB 291 is easily the most significant piece of drunk driving legisla-
tion passed in Nebraska in more than twenty years. In addition to
adjusting certain provisions of the existing scheme, 28 LB 291 makes
23. Id. at § 1.
24. The following major bills were enacted during this period: LB 651, 1980 Neb.
Laws 500 (granting judges the discretion to require alcohol treatment as a condi-
tion of probation); LB 568, 1982 Neb. Laws 517 (amending penalty and sentencing
provisions); LB 153, 1986 Neb. Laws 216 (amending penalty and sentencing provi-
sions); LB 404, 1987 Neb. Laws 945 (establishing more specific standards for alco-
hol content in a motorist's blood, breath, or urine in reaction to State v. Burling,
224 Neb. 725, 400 N.W.2d 872 (1987)); LB 377, 1988 Neb. Laws 356 (providing that
the Director may reinstate licenses revoked for refusal where the motorist agrees
to plead guilty to driving under the influence and providing that a revocation
period does not begin until all appeals have been exhausted); LB 799, 1990 Neb.
Laws 358 (amending statutory language to encompass persons under the influ-
ence of drugs).
25. NEB. REv. STAT. § 39-669.15 (Reissue 1988)(amended 1992).
26. NEB. REv. STAT. § 39-669.16 (Reissue 1988)(amended 1992). In addition, if the mo-
torist agreed to plead guilty to driving under the influence, the administrative
revocation process was terminated. Id.
27. NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-669.07 (Supp. 1990)(amended 1992).
28. In addition to the major amendments concerning implementation of ALR, LB 291
included a number of significant changes which fall outside the scope of this
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profound changes to Nebraska law by implementing a system of ad-
ministrative license revocation (ALR). By greatly expanding the role
of the Department of Motor Vehicles, the new law represents not only
a change in procedure, but a change in philosophy. Previous deter-
rence efforts have focused on establishing severe penalties. Under
ALR, the penalties remain substantial, 29 but the focus shifts to swift
and certain punishment. Under ALR, an inebriated motorist will
likely lose his or her license long before a criminal trial even begins.
To implement this approach, LB 291 looks to law enforcement officers
and the Department of Motor Vehicles for the efficiency that clogged
courts have been unable to provide.
Under prior law, the administrative process was triggered only if
the motorist refused to submit to a test. LB 291 expands the role of
the Department of Motor Vehicles by subjecting both motorists who
refuse a test and motorists who fail a chemical test to the administra-
tive revocation process.30 In so doing, the bill establishes an independ-
Note. Concerning criminal penalties, the bill implemented new mandatory mini-
mum and maximum sentences for second, third, and fourth convictions for driv-
ing while intoxicated. LB 291 § 1(1); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-106(1)(Cum. Supp.
1992). In addition, the bill established minimum and maximum license revoca-
tion periods for motor vehicle homicide and for inflicting serious bodily injury by
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence. LB 291 §§ 2, 13; NEB. REV.
STAT. §§ 28-106, 39-669.39 (Cum. Supp. 1992). In its final penalty adjustment, the
bill implemented a requirement that first time offenders submit to an alcohol
assessment at their own expense. LB 291 § 4(8); NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-
669.07(8)(Cum. Supp. 1992). A number of questions concerning the implementa-
tion of these changes are addressed in an opinion issued by the Attorney General
on June 29, 1992. 92 Op. Att'y Gen. 087.
Also of note is the fact that LB 291 eliminated urine testing from the per se
scheme. As such, it is no longer illegal per se for a motorist to have "ten hun-
dredths of one gram or more by weight of alcohol per one hundred milliliters [in]
his or her urine." LB 291 § 4(1)(d). The decision of the Legislature in this regard
was no doubt influenced by the supreme court's decision in State v. Donaldson,
234 Neb. 683, 452 N.W.2d 531 (1990), where the court struck down the procedure
used to test urine.
Furthermore, LB 291 extended the reach of state drunk driving law. Instead
of applying only to public highways, the provisions now apply everywhere in the
state, with the exception of private property that is not open to public access. LB
291 § 3(1); NEB. REv. STAT. § 39-603(1)(Cum. Supp. 1992).
Finally, LB 291 expressly defined who may draw blood for the purposes of a
blood test. Instead of relying on the rather vague term, "qualified technician,"
the Legislature specifically provided that trained persons employed by a licensed
facility may draw blood for these purposes. LB 291 §§ 6-8, 17; NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 39-669.11 to 39-669.14, 71-1,103 (Cum. Supp. 1992).
29. A person who refuses to submit to a chemical test is subject to an administrative
license revocation period of one year. LB 291 § 11(1); NEB. REv. STAT. § 39-
669.16(1)(Cum. Supp. 1992). A person who fails a chemical test is subject to an
administrative license revocation period of ninety days for a first offense and a
revocation period of one year for subsequent violations. Id.
30. LB 291 § 5(4); NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-669.08(4)(Cum. Supp. 1992). By subjecting
persons who fail a chemical test to administrative revocation, the number of per-
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ent forum in which to litigate license revocation issues for all
offenders and provides a vehicle to circumvent court delays.
In order to provide for "swift and certain" punishment in this new
forum, LB 291 implements the revocation procedures that are the es-
sence of ALR. Under previous law, a person refusing to submit to a
chemical test was cited by the officer. The officer then prepared a
sworn report that was forwarded to the Department of Motor Vehi-
cles. 31 Upon receiving the report, the Director scheduled a hearing,
which usually occurred some weeks (or months) later.3 2 Only after
the hearing, upon a finding that a refusal had occurred, would the Di-
rector finally revoke the motorist's license.3 3 ALR turns this process
on its head.
Under LB 291, persons arrested on suspicion of driving while in-
toxicated who are asked to submit to a chemical test face an expedited
revocation process. Upon arrest, the motorist is advised of the conse-
quences of refusing the test and the consequences of failing the test.3 4
With one possible exception,35 if the motorist then refuses to take the
test or fails the test, the revocation process is set in motion.
Immediately upon refusal or failure, the officer, acting on behalf of
the Director of the Department of Motor Vehicles, is to impound the
motorist's license and verbally serve notice that the license will be au-
tomatically revoked thirty days from the date of the arrest unless a
petition for hearing is filed with the Director within ten days of the
date of arrest.3 6 The officer then issues the motorist a thirty-day i-
sons drawn into the administrative process increases exponentially. It is this in-
crease that provides the potential for thousands of administrative hearings and
district court appeals.
31. NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-669.15 (Reissue 1988)(amended 1992).
32. NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-669.16 (Reissue 1988)(amended 1992).
33. Id.
34. LB 291 § 5(9); NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-669.08(10)(Cum. Supp. 1992).
35. A careful reading of the statutes reveals a potential loophole in the otherwise
broad coverage of ALR. Under the new scheme, only a "person arrested pursu-
ant to section 39-669.08" is subject to administrative revocation. LB 291 § 9(2)-(3);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-669.15(2)-(3)(Cum. Supp. 1992). Interpreted strictly, § 39-
669.08 provides for arrest only where a motorist fails a preliminary breath test or
refuses a preliminary breath test. LB 291 § 5(3); NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-
669.08(2)(Cum. Supp. 1992). Thus, it is arguable that a motorist arrested in a ju-
risdiction where preliminary breath testing equipment is not available does not
qualify as a "person arrested pursuant to section 39-669.08." Rather, the motorist
is a person arrested for a violation of the general prohibition against drunk driv-
ing. LB 291 § 4; NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-669.07 (Cum. Supp. 1992).
Under such a reading of the statutes, a motorist who is not given a preliminary
breath test, but submits to and fails a formal chemical test would not be subject to
administrative revocation. It seems relatively clear, however, that the Legisla-
ture did not intend to create such a loophole and it remains to be seen how the
courts will interpret the statutory language.
36. LB 291 § 9(4); NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-669.15(4)(Cum. Supp. 1992).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
cense and provides an addressed envelope and a petition form that
may be used by the motorist to request a hearing before the
Director. 37
Next, the officer is to prepare a sworn report stating that 1) the
motorist was validly arrested for driving while intoxicated; 2) the mo-
torist was requested to submit to a chemical test; 3) the motorist was
advised of the consequences of failing a chemical test or refusing to
submit to a chemical test; and 4) the motorist refused to submit to a
chemical test or the test indicated the presence of alcohol in excess of
statutory limits.38 This report and the motorist's permanent license
are then forwarded to the Department of Motor Vehicles. 39
In some instances, however, it is impossible to follow this proce-
dure. If, for instance, a blood test is taken and the results are not im-
mediately available, an alternative method of revocation is provided.
In such a case, the officer does not seize the license, but simply for-
wards the sworn report to the Department of Motor Vehicles when
the test results are available. The Department then serves notice to
the motorist by certified or registered mail.40 In this mailing, the De-
partment directs the licensee to surrender his or her license and sup-
plies a temporary license and a petition form with which to request a
hearing. The license revocation takes effect thirty days from the date
of mailing unless the petition for hearing is postmarked or returned to
the director within ten days after receipt of the notice of revocation.41
If the permanent license has not been surrendered at the time the
petition for hearing is received, the Director will reject the petition.42
As such, the initial phase of the "swift and certain" approach im-
pounds the motorist's license immediately and provides only ten days
to request a hearing. If a hearing is not requested, revocation is com-
plete within thirty days and ALR has disciplined the drunk driver in
only a month's time. Even if a hearing is requested, the emphasis on
swift resolution continues. LB 291 requires the Director to conduct
the hearing within twenty days after a petition is filed.43 At the hear-
ing, the issues that may be raised are limited. The statute provides
that only the following issues may be raised: 1) whether the officer
had probable cause to believe the motorist was operating a vehicle
under the influence; 2) whether the motorist was lawfully arrested; 3)
whether the motorist was advised of the consequences of refusing to
submit to a chemical test or of failing a chemical test; and 4) whether
37. Id.
38. LB 291 § 9(2)-(3); NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-669.15(2)-(3)(Cum. Supp. 1992).
39. Id.
40. LB 291 § 9(5); NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-669.15(5)(Cum. Supp. 1992).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. LB 291 § 9(6); NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-669.15(6)(Cum. Supp. 1992).
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the person actually refused to submit to a chemical test or whether
the motorist's blood or breath contained an illegal concentration of
alcohol." At the conclusion of the hearing, the Director is allotted
seven days in which to make a decision. 45
Thus, even if a hearing is held, the revocation process is likely to be
complete in fewer than thirty-seven days. Though the licensee may be
able to prolong the hearing process somewhat, such delays do not post-
pone the punishment. The filing of a petition does not prevent auto-
matic revocation of the license after thirty days.46 Neither does a
continuance of the hearing date stay the expiration of the temporary
license, unless the continuance is requested by the Director.47
It is only after the administrative process is complete that the po-
tential for substantial delay appears and ALR shows its vulnerable
side. Persons aggrieved by an order of the Director are entitled to
appeal in district court pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act
(hereinafter APA).48 Under the APA, the district court judge may
stay the order of revocation pending judicial review.49 In such a case,
the expedited administrative process necessarily succumbs to the very
judicial delays it sought to avoid. In order to reach this point, how-
ever, the motorist must devote significant resources to his or her legal
defense.
Even if the Director's order is not appealed, the administrative re-
sult remains vulnerable because of another link to the courts. For mo-
torists who submit to a chemical test and fail, all administrative
proceedings are dismissed or the motorist's license is immediately re-
instated if criminal charges are not filed within thirty days of arrest, if
the criminal charge is dismissed, or if the motorist is found not guilty
of violating § 39-669.07.50 In this way, the statutory scheme avoids the
somewhat curious result of an administrative conviction and a crimi-
nal acquittal for the same offense.
IV. ISSUES IN ADMINISTRATIVE LICENSE REVOCATION
If the motorist does request an administrative hearing, there are a
number of issues to be considered. In light of the significant changes
outlined above, one might expect that the hearing officers of the De-
partment of Motor Vehicles were thrown into uncharted legal terri-
44. Id.
45. LB 291 § 9(7); NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-669.15(7)(Cum. Supp. 1992).
46. LB 291 § 9(6); NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-669.15(6)(Cum. Supp. 1992).
47. Id.
48. NEB. REV. STAT. § 36-669.18 (Reissue 1988).
49. NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-917(3)(Cum. Supp. 1992). The extent to which these appeals
are utilized may depend on judges' willingness to grant temporary stays. See in-
fra text accompanying notes 162-63.
50. LB 291 § 11(4); NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-669.16(4)(Cum. Supp. 1992).
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tory when the new scheme took effect. In fact, however, the courts
have blazed a trail for the hearing officers to follow. In substance, LB
291 represents more of a change in forum than a change of law. Many
of the issues have already been addressed by the courts in criminal
actions for driving while intoxicated, in court review of orders of the
Department of Motor Vehicles, or in court review of agency decisions
in general. The primary task of those litigating in the new administra-
tive forum is to find the existing law and apply it to the case in ques-
tion. With this task in mind, the following sections discuss those
issues that are most likely to arise in ALR litigation and the legal tools
available to deal with them.
A. Constitutionality
The first issue to be considered is whether ALR is constitutional.
Though it does not appear that a challenge to the statutes' constitu-
tionality could be raised at the hearing level,51 it is almost certain that
the scheme will, at some point, face a constitutional challenge pursu-
ant to a district court appeal. Many of the constitutional issues relat-
ing to drunk driving law have already been addressed by the courts
and are not obviously affected by LB 291.52 The expedited revocation
process of ALR does raise new questions in the area of due process,
however.
Early Nebraska case law took the position that driving was a State-
51. The statutory scheme limits the issues which may be raised in the administrative
hearing to whether there was probable cause for arrest, whether the arrest was
lawful, whether the motorist was properly advised of the consequences of his or
her actions, and whether there was an actual test failure or test refusal. LB 291
§ 9(c); NEB. REv. STAT. § 39-669.15(6)(Cum. Supp. 1992).
52. See State v. Kubik, 235 Neb. 612, 456 N.W.2d 487 (1990)(holding that the drunk
driving scheme does not violate the equal protection clause); State v. Green, 229
Neb. 493, 427 N.W.2d 304 (1988)(holding that Miranda warnings are not required
prior to administering a chemical test and that such a test does not constitute self-
incriminating testimony); Clontz v. Jensen, 227 Neb. 191, 416 N.W.2d 577
(1987)(holding that a motorist has no right to consult with an attorney prior to a
chemical test); Guerzon v. Jensen, 225 Neb. 712, 407 N.W.2d 788 (1987)(holding
that Miranda warnings are not required prior to a chemical test and that a motor-
ist has no right to consult an attorney prior to a chemical test); State v. Bishop,
224 Neb. 522, 399 N.W.2d 271 (1987)(holding that evidence obtained in the implied
consent context is not testimonial or communicative and does not fall within the
privilege against self-incrimination); Porter v. Jensen, 223 Neb. 438, 390 N.W.2d
511 (1986)(holding that treating occupational drivers and pleasure drivers the
same is not violative of equal protection); State v. Howard, 193 Neb. 45, 225
N.W.2d 391 (1975)(considering chemical tests in light of the Fourth Amendment);
Wiseman v. Sullivan, 190 Neb. 724, 211 N.W.2d 906 (1973)(holding that Miranda
warnings and consultation with an attorney are not required prior to testing, and
that chemical evidence does not fall under the privilege against self-
incrimination).
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granted privilege that did not warrant due process protection.5 3 In
Bell v. Burson,5 4 however, the U.S. Supreme Court took exception to
this view. The Court found that once driver's licenses are issued, their
continued possession may become essential to the pursuit of a liveli-
hood such that they represent a constitutionally protected property
right. "In such cases the licenses are not to be taken away without
that procedural due process required by the Fourteenth
Amendment."s5
Since Bell, the Court has more precisely defined just what level of
due process is required. In Dixon v. Love,5 6 the Court considered the
question of pre-hearing license deprivation where the motorist had
numerous moving violations and had lost his license on "points." In
finding that a hearing was not required prior to revocation, the Court
adopted a three-factor balancing test.5 7 Under this approach, the
Dixon Court considered 1) the private interest that would be affected
by the official action; 2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used; and 3) the Government's inter-
est, including the function involved and the administrative burden
that additional procedures would entail.58 Though the private interest
was important, the Court found this interest to be outweighed by the
low risk of erroneous deprivation and the "important public interest
in safety on the roads and highways, and in the prompt removal of a
safety hazard."9
Two years later, the Court directly considered the constitutionality
of a Massachusetts summary suspension statute in Mackey v. Mon-
trym.6 0 Applying the same three-part test, the Court found the Mas-
sachusetts scheme to be consistent with due process. The Court found
the risk of erroneous deprivation to be low in light of the presumption
that a law enforcement officer is a trained, experienced, and compe-
tent observer.61 In addition, the Court gave great weight to the State's
interest in preserving the safety of its public highways.62 Since
Mackey, the Supreme Court has not considered a due process chal-
lenge to ALR.63
53. Hadden v. Aitken, 156 Neb. 215, 222, 55 N.W.2d 620, 623 (1952).
54. 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
55. Id. at 539.
56. 431 U.S. 105 (1977).
57. Id. at 112 (utilizing the three-factor test first articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)).
58. Id. at 112-13,
59. Id. at 114 (citation omitted).
60. 443 U.S. 1 (1979).
61. Id. at 14.
62. Id. at 17-19.
63. For a more detailed analysis of the holdings in these cases, see John H. Reese,
Summary Suspension of Driver Licenses of Drunken Drivers-Constitutional
Dimensions, in NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DE-
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Based on the above, it appears that the Nebraska version of ALR
passes constitutional muster. Though the private interest in a driver's
license is significant, LB 291 contains a provision to guard against erro-
neous deprivation. Unlike the Massachusetts scheme in Mackey, the
Nebraska law provides the motorist with a thirty-day license. As such,
there is no actual deprivation until the motorist has had an opportu-
nity to be heard.64 Furthermore, the State's compelling interest in
preserving the safety of its highways weighs heavily in favor of
constitutionality.
Additional support for this view is found in Nebraska case law. In
considering an administrative revocation based on "points," the Ne-
braska Supreme Court looked to the district court appeal to satisfy
due process. The court stated, "The due process requirements may
under some circumstances be satisfied if full hearing in the courts is
available after the administrative order with judicial power to stay ir-
reparable injury pending court hearing."6 5 Under this view, even if
the administrative procedures are lacking, the Nebraska ALR scheme
satisfies due process by providing the right to appeal the administra-
tive order in district court.
B. Tools of Litigation
As it appears that ALR falls within constitutional boundaries, the
litigants in the administrative forum will be obliged to deal with the
substantive and procedural aspects of ALR. An examination of this
area of the law reveals that the Legislature has provided a number of
tools to be used in litigating these issues.
As would be expected in a statutory scheme intended to continue
the crack-down on drunk driving, the tools available to the State are
formidable. From a procedural standpoint, LB 291 provides a tool for
the State to avoid litigation entirely. If the motorist fails to file a peti-
tion for a hearing within ten days, the revocation cannot be challenged
PARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, REDUCING HIGHWAY CRASHES THROUGH ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE LICENSE REVOCATION (1986). See also Larry A. Davis, Developments in
the Illinois Summary Suspension Law, 79 ILL. B.J. 16 (1991).
64. Under certain circumstances, the motorist could actually be deprived of driving
privileges for a few days. For instance, if the petition for a hearing is received by
the Director on the tenth day after the arrest, the hearing need not be scheduled
until twenty days later. After the hearing, the Director is given seven days to
render a decision. In such a case, the total time between arrest and a final order
could total thirty-seven days. Since the temporary driver's license expires on the
thirtieth day, the motorist could actually be deprived of his or her license for a
few days before the Director issues an order. A potential deprivation of a few
days does not appear to alter the constitutional analysis, however.
65. Stauffer v. Weedlun, 188 Neb. 105, 113, 195 N.W.2d 218, 224 (1972)(citation
omitted).
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and will take effect automatically upon expiration of the motorist's
temporary license.
In the event a hearing is requested, the primary tool available to
the State results from legislative inaction. LB 291 does not alter the
basic requirements for a conviction of driving while intoxicated. The
substantive issues that may be raised under ALR are the same issues
that have been litigated in the criminal process for years. As a result,
there is a large body of Nebraska case law available to the litigants.
Though the mere existence of such case law does not suggest an ad-
vantage to one party over the other, the courts in Nebraska have not
looked favorably upon the drunken driver. As discussed more fully
below,6 6 the issues in question have been consistently decided in favor
of the State.
Another tool results directly from legislative action. LB 291 in-
cludes a clear statement of purpose in which the Legislature pro-
nounced that drunken drivers "present a hazard to the health and
safety of all persons using the highways" requiring a clear commit-
ment to "swift and certain revocation."67 Armed with legislative in-
tent, the State can argue persuasively that the statutes must be
liberally construed in the interest of public health and safety.68
The motorist is left in a much less enviable position. That is not to
say, however, that he or she is defenseless. The best defense, of
course, is innocence. Even short of innocence, however, there is some
room to avoid punishment.
Though it is not obvious from the face of the statute, the motorist
retains an important tool. Under the APA, which sets forth the mini-
mum administrative procedures for all agencies, the defendant has the
right to request that the Department of Motor Vehicles be bound by
the rules of evidence applicable in district court.69 Invoking the rules
of evidence makes much more arduous the State's task of establishing
a prima facie case for revocation. The rules provide significant obsta-
66. See infra text accompanying notes 74-147.
67. The purpose statement in LB 291 provides:
Because persons who drive while under the influence of alcohol pres-
ent a hazard to the health and safety of all persons using the highways, a
procedure is needed for the swift and certain revocation of the operator's
license of any person who has shown himself or herself to be a health
and safety hazard by driving with an excessive concentration of alcohol
in his or her body and to deter others from driving while under the influ-
ence of alcohol.
LB 291 § 9(1); NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-669.15(1)(Cum. Supp. 1992).
68. See Adkisson v. City of Columbus, 214 Neb. 129, 133, 333 N.W.2d 661, 664
(1983)(" 'The obligation of the court in consideration and application of a statute
is to determine and give effect to the purpose and intention of the Legislature...
.' ")(quoting Ledwith v. Bankers Life Ins., 156 Neb. 107,115-16, 54 N.W.2d 409, 416
(1952)).
69. NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-914(1)(Reissue 1987).
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cles to the admission of evidence which is damaging to the defendant.
Chemical test results, for instance, may be found inadmissible if the
State fails to establish, as foundation evidence, that the technician
properly calibrated the testing device.70
Without the rules of evidence, the hearing operates under a consid-
erably relaxed evidentiary standard. Under the APA, "evidence
which possesses probative value commonly accepted by reasonably
prudent persons" is admissible. 71 Such a standard allows the hearing
officer to receive into evidence almost anything he or she finds to be
relevant and reliable.72
Unfortunately for the licensee, the advantages of the rules of evi-
dence do not come without a price. In order to bind the agency to the
rules of evidence, the licensee must agree to pay the costs associated
with conducting a formal evidentiary hearing, including court report-
ing services. 73 Other costs to the motorist are less obvious, but no less
onerous. In order to take full advantage of the rules of evidence, it is
necessary for the motorist to hire an attorney with some expertise in
the area. In addition, if the motorist believes that there has been an
error in the application of the rules of evidence, he or she may have to
bear the cost of a district court appeal in order to fully realize the
protection of the rules of evidence.
In sum, the available tools of litigation accurately reflect the Legis-
lature's intent to provide "certain" punishment for drunk drivers. By
preserving the applicability of existing case law and putting a price on
the rules of evidence, the new statutory scheme makes it very difficult
for the defendant to avoid revocation.
C. Substantive Issues
The fundamental issue in administrative hearings under ALR is
whether the motorist failed a properly administered chemical test or,
in the case of refusal, whether the motorist refused to comply with a
valid request to submit to a chemical test. To reach such a determina-
tion, a number of questions must first be answered. As a prerequisite
to a valid request to submit to a chemical test, it must be established
that the motorist was properly apprehended, that the motorist was ac-
tually operating a motor vehicle, that the officer had probable cause to
arrest the defendant for driving while intoxicated, and that the motor-
70. See State v. Gerber, 206 Neb. 75, 85-89, 291 N.W.2d 403, 409-11 (1980). It should be
noted that in such a case, the inquiry is not whether the machine was actually
calibrated, but whether the State introduced evidence of calibration as foundation
evidence for the test results. See also infra text accompanying notes 113-26.
71. NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-914(1)(Reissue 1987).
72. See Steven L. Willborn, A Time for Change: A Critical Analysis of the Nebraska
Administrative Procedure Act, 60 NEB. L. REV. 1, 21 n.140 (1981).
73. NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-914(1)(Reissue 1987).
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ist was advised of the consequences of a chemical test.7 4 If any link in
this chain of events is missing, the request to submit to a chemical test
is improper and the motorist's license cannot be revoked. If the chain
of events is complete, then the fundamental issue of the motorist's
failure or refusal can be addressed.
To deal with these issues, the litigants must simply look to the
wealth of case law on the subject. The courts have considered each
topic in some form. In fact, the law relating to many of the issues is
practically settled. The state of each of these areas as reflected in Ne-
braska case law will be addressed in turn.
1. Operation or Actual Physical Control of Vehicle
In order to establish that a motorist was driving while intoxicated,
it is obviously necessary to prove that the motorist was actually driv-
ing a motor vehicle. In the terminology of the statute, it must be es-
tablished that the motorist was "operating or in the actual physical
control of a motor vehicle."75 This inquiry is relevant to the adminis-
trative process on two levels. As an initial matter, actual physical con-
trol is relevant to the question of whether there is any violation of the
statute. In addition, the inquiry is relevant to the question of whether
the officer had valid grounds to request a chemical test.7 6
In most instances, it is obvious that the licensee was driving the
vehicle and this question is easily resolved. In those instances where it
is less clear, case law is available to provide guidance to the hearing
officer. The test articulated by the courts turns on whether the mo-
torist actually physically handled the controls of a motor vehicle while
under the influence of alcohol.77 As applied by the courts, the test is
relatively easy to satisfy.
In State v. Baker,7 8 for instance, the defendant was found to be op-
erating a vehicle in violation of the statute for steering a vehicle while
it was being towed. In this case, the officer saw the defendant behind
the wheel while the vehicle was being pulled out of a ditch. The en-
gine was running and the vehicle was in reverse, but was moved only a
few feet under its own power in order to adjust the slack in the tow
chain. Despite the fact that there was evidence to show that the de-
74. See Wisch v. Jensen, 221 Neb. 609, 612, 379 N.W.2d 755, 757 (1986); Fulmer v.
Jensen, 221 Neb. 582, 589, 379 N.W.2d 736,741 (1986). These prerequisites roughly
mirror the issues which may be raised in an administrative hearing under LB 291
§ 9(6)(c); NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-669.15(6)(c)(Cum. Supp. 1992).
75. LB 291 § 9(6)(c); NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-669.15(6)(c)(Cum. Supp. 1992).
76. See Emmons v. Jensen, 221 Neb. 444, 447, 378 N.W.2d 147, 149 (1985)("[T]he ar-
resting officer must have 'reasonable grounds' to believe that the licensee was
either driving a motor vehicle or in actual physical control of same while under
the influence of intoxicating liquor.") (citing NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-669.08).
77. State v. Baker, 236 Neb. 261, 264, 461 N.W.2d 251, 253 (1990).
78. Id.
1993]
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fendant had not been driving when the vehicle went into the ditch, the
court found that he physically handled the controls of a vehicle while
under the influence in violation of the law7 9
In addition, the courts have been more than willing to accept cir-
cumstantial evidence to establish that the defendant operated a vehi-
cle. In State v. Miller,8 0 a motorist came over a hill and struck a
vehicle that was parked on the side of the road. The defendant was
sitting in the parked vehicle and was found to be intoxicated. He
claimed he was not the driver, stating that the driver ran off after the
accident. The police never found the missing driver and the defendant
was convicted of driving while intoxicated, though no one actually saw
him drive.81
As such, there is settled law which can be pulled into the adminis-
trative forum to address this issue. Application of the courts' test
leaves precious little room for a motorist found behind the wheel to
prevail.
2. Investigative Stop
The case law concerning the propriety of an investigative stop is
also relatively well-settled and largely defers to the judgment of the
law enforcement officer. On its face, the test articulated by the courts
appears relatively strict. The officer must have a "reasonable suspi-
cion based on articulable facts" that a crime has been committed.8 2
Put another way, the officer must have a "particularized and objective
basis" for suspecting the motorist of criminal activity.8 3
The courts' application of this test is not restrictive, however, and
grants considerable discretion to law enforcement. First of all, the of-
ficer's "reasonable suspicion" is to be considered in light of the "total-
ity of the circumstances."8 4 The "totality of the circumstances"
includes all of the officer's objective observations "as well as the suspi-
79. Id. at 265, 461 N.W.2d at 253. See also State v. Dubany, 184 Neb. 337, 167 N.W.2d
556 (1969)(finding that a motorist was "operating" the vehicle by spinning the
tires, though the vehicle was stuck in a ditch); Waite v. State, 169 Neb. 113, 98
N.W.2d 688 (1959)(holding that a motorist found asleep behind the wheel of a
running vehicle was "operating" the vehicle).
80. 226 Neb. 576, 412 N.W.2d 849 (1987).
81. Id. at 579-80, 412 N.W.2d at 851. See also State v. Baker, 224 Neb. 130, 395 N.W.2d
766 (1986)(holding that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish
operation of the vehicle where the motorist was found parked on side of the road,
with the engine off and the keys in his pocket).
82. State v. Pillard, 235 Neb 642, 646, 456 N.W.2d 755, 757 (1990)("The test to deter-
mine whether an investigative stop is justified is whether the police officer has a
reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts which indicate that a crime has
occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur and that the suspect may be
involved.").
83. Id.
84. Id.
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cion drawn by a trained and experienced police officer by inference
and deduction...."85 In addition, the officer's suspicion need not be
based solely on his own observations, but may utilize the collective
knowledge of all officers involved.86
The discretion accorded law enforcement by these holdings is illus-
trated in State v. Pillard,8 7 where an officer was outside a bar monitor-
ing the vehicle of a man whose license was under suspension. Shortly
after the officer ended his surveillance, another officer observed the
vehicle on the highway and followed it. Though no driving violations
were observed, the vehicle did pull off the road on two occasions to let
the officer pass. On the advice of the first officer, the second officer
stopped the vehicle. The vehicle's owner, whose license was under
suspension, was only a passenger in the vehicle, but the driver was
found to be intoxicated. Applying the above test, the court found the
investigative stop to be proper.8 8
3. Probable Cause for Arrest
The issue of probable cause for arrest is more complicated and
somewhat less settled than the issues discussed above. The minimum
guidelines for this inquiry are provided by the Legislature. By statute,
an officer may make a warrantless misdemeanor arrest if he or she,
has reasonable cause to believe that such person either (a) will not be appre-
hended unless immediately arrested, (b) may cause injury to himself or her-
self or others or damage to property unless immediately arrested, (c) may
destroy or conceal evidence of the commission of such misdemeanor, or (d)
has committed a misdemeanor in the presence of the officer.8 9
Since driving while intoxicated is a misdemeanor, one of the condi-
tions set forth above must be present in order to make a valid warrant-
less arrest.9 0 The presence of one of these conditions is normally not
difficult to establish. It is a common circumstance that the intoxicated
person constitutes a danger to himself or others or property such that
an arrest is proper under subsection (b). Also, it is common that a
misdemeanor has been committed in the presence of the officer so
that an arrest is proper under subsection (d). Even if these are not
present, it has been held that the natural metabolic processes of the
body tend to destroy evidence of intoxication so that immediate arrest
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. 235 Neb. 642, 456 N.W.2d 755 (1990).
88. Id. at 647, 456 N.W.2d at 759. In a more common factual setting, the courts have
routinely held that an officer who observes a vehicle weaving may properly make
an investigative stop. State v. Beerbohm, 229 Neb. 439, 427 N.W.2d 75 (1988);
State v. Dail, 228 Neb. 653,424 N.W.2d 99 (1988); State v. Thomte, 226 Neb 659,413
N.W.2d 916 (1987); State v. Daniels, 220 Neb. 480, 370 N.W.2d 179 (1985).
89. NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-404.02 (Reissue 1989).
90. State v. Marcotte, 233 Neb. 533, 538, 446 N.W.2d 228, 232 (1989).
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under subsection (c) is proper.91
Building on these minimum requirements, the courts have formu-
lated a more specific inquiry. The general rule concerning probable
cause for arrest as articulated by the supreme court can be found in
State v. Twohig.92 In this case, the court stated: "'When a law en-
forcement officer has knowledge, based on information reasonably
trustworthy under the circumstances, which justifies a prudent belief
that a suspect is committing or has committed a crime, the officer has
probable cause to arrest without a warrant.' 93
In a somewhat different approach, the court has also backed into a
finding of probable cause. In the context of a criminal prosecution for
drunk driving, the court has held, "Either a law enforcement officer's
observations of a defendant's intoxicated behavior or the defendant's
poor performance on field sobriety tests constitutes sufficient evidence
to sustain a conviction of driving while under the influence of alco-
holic beverages." 94 If such officer observations are sufficient to sup-
port a conviction for driving under the influence, it is clear that they
satisfy the "lesser standard" of reasonable grounds for arrest.95
In what is becoming a familiar theme, the court's application of
these rules is considerably less restrictive than the rules themselves
suggest. First of all, it is provided by statute that the officer may take
into account the totality of circumstances, including any expert knowl-
edge or experience possessed by the officer.96
Furthermore, it has been held that the existence of probable cause
is not based on the knowledge of a single officer, but on the "collective
information possessed by all the officers engaged in a common investi-
91. State v. Wegener, 239 Neb. 946, 951, 479 N.W.2d 783, 787 (1992); State v. Marcotte,
233 Neb. 533, 539, 446 N.W.2d 228, 233 (1989).
92. 238 Neb. 92, 469 N.W.2d 344 (1991).
93. Id. at 106, 469 N.W.2d at 354 (quoting State v. Blakely, 227 Neb. 816, 821, 420
N.W.2d 300, 304 (1988)). The court has held similarly in numerous cases. E.g.,
State v. Grantzinger, 235 Neb. 974, 979, 458 N.W.2d 461, 465 (1990); State v.
Marcotte, 233 Neb. 533, 538, 446 N.W.2d 228, 232 (1989); State v. Bishop, 224 Neb.
522, 525, 399 N.W.2d 271, 275 (1987); State v. Klingelhoefer, 222 Neb. 219, 222-23,
382 N.W.2d 366, 369 (1986).
94. State v. Lichti, 219 Neb. 894, 897, 367 N.W.2d 138, 141 (1985).
95. Wisch v. Jensen, 221 Neb. 609, 612, 379 N.W.2d 755, 757 (1986).
96. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-404.03 (Reissue 1989) provides:
In determining whether reasonable cause exists to justify an arrest, a
law enforcement officer may take into account all facts and circum-
stances, including those based upon any expert knowledge or experience
which the officer in fact possessed, which a prudent officer would judge
relevant to the likelihood that a crime has been committed and that the
person to be arrested has committed it, and for such purpose the officer
may rely on information he receives from any informant whom it is rea-
sonable under the circumstances to credit, whether or not at the time of
making the arrest the officer knows the informant's identity.
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gation."9 7 Under this "collective knowledge doctrine," an officer who
does not have personal knowledge of any of the facts establishing
probable cause for the arrest may nevertheless make the arrest if he
or she is merely carrying out the directions of another officer who
does have probable cause.98
Even less restrictive is the rather complicated assertion that prob-
able cause has an independent existence. In State v. Sassen,99 the
court found that the validity of an arrest was premised on the exist-
ence of probable cause, not on the officer's knowledge that probable
cause existed.100 The court cited with approval a Ninth Circuit case
where the court found that the issue of probable cause was not fore-
closed by the officer's testimony that she did not believe she had prob-
able cause to make the arrest.101 Such an approach appears to give the
court the ability to "find" probable cause even when the officer did
not.
The only significant limitation placed on the officer's right to make
an arrest is a geographic one. In State v. Tingle, 0 2 the court held that
an officer cannot make a valid arrest for a misdemeanor outside of his
geographical jurisdiction. The court found no statutes that authorized
a misdemeanor arrest outside the officer's jurisdiction and held that
the common law powers of an officer to make a "fresh pursuit" arrest
were limited to felonies.3O3
In sum, establishing probable cause for arrest is not as significant
an obstacle to the State as it may initially appear. As applied by the
courts, the probable cause inquiry will disallow only the most irregu-
lar arrests.
4. Advisement of Consequences
The final prerequisite to a valid request to submit to a chemical
test is a proper advisement. LB 291 specifically requires that the mo-
torist be advised as to the consequences of refusing to submit to a
chemical test and the consequences of failing a chemical test.104 This
requirement is not entirely new. The previous statutory scheme re-
quired the officer to advise the motorist of the consequences of re-
97. State v. Wegener 239 Neb. 946, 949, 479 N.W.2d 783, 786 (1992).
98. Id. at 949, 479 N.W.2d at 786.
99. 240 Neb. 773, 484 N.W.2d 469 (1992).
100. Id. at 777, 484 N.W.2d at 472 (citing State v. Roach, 234 Neb. 620, 626, 452 N.W.2d
262, 267 (1990)).
101. State v. Sassen, 240 Neb. 773, 777, 484 N.W.2d 469, 472 (1992)(citing United States
v. Moses, 796 F.2d 281 (9th Cir. 1986)).
102. 239 Neb. 558, 477 N.W.2d 544 (1991).
103. Id. at 562,477 N.W.2d at 547. See also State v. Masat, 239 Neb. 849, 479 N.W.2d 131
(1992).
104. LB 291 § 5(9); NEB. REv. STAT. § 39-669.08(10)(Cum. Supp. 1992).
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fusal.05 As such, there is significant case law available to assist the
hearing officer in determining whether a motorist has been ade-
quately advised.
Initially, it should be noted that the advisement referred to in this
section does not encompass Miranda warnings or trigger the right to
an attorney. The courts have consistently held that Miranda warn-
ings are not required prior to a request to submit to a chemical test.1 06
In addition, administrative revocation has been characterized as reme-
dial, rather than punitive, so that the right to an attorney does not
attach.107
Instead, the advisement serves a much simpler purpose. It is in-
tended to ensure that the motorist knows and is in a position to make
a rational and voluntary decision as to whether he or she will comply
with the law.108 Although simple in theory, there is an obvious obsta-
cle to the orderly application of this noble concept. In the real world it
is very difficult to ensure that an intoxicated person is in a position to
make a "rational" decision concerning a chemical test. As a result, the
courts have focused primarily on whether the officer read the pre-
scribed advisement form and require only minimal understanding by
the defendant.
The limited role of the advisement is summarized in the following
oft-quoted passage: "The only understanding required by the licensee
is that he has been asked to take a test. It is not a defense that he does
not understand the consequences of refusal or is not able to make a
reasoned judgment as to what course of action to take."'109 Under this
standard, it is very difficult to establish that the motorist was not
properly advised. Even where the officer misread the penalties for
refusal, the court found the motorist's understanding to be ade-
quate.110 In fact, only two cases could be located in which the court
recognized a lack of understanding on the part of the defendant. In
Martinez v. Peterson,':" the court found that the motorist's refusal
was justifiable because he did not speak English and could not under-
105. NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-669.08(9)(Cum. Supp. 1990)(amended 1992).
106. Fulmer v. Jensen, 221 Neb. 582, 587, 379 N.W.2d 736,740 (1986). In fact, giving the
Miranda warnings may be improper if they are mingled with the implied consent
advisement. See Wiseman v. Sullivan, 190 Neb. 724, 729, 211 N.W.2d 906, 910
(1973).
107. Bapat v. Jensen, 220 Neb. 763, 765, 371 N.W.2d 742, 745 (1985).
108. State v. Deets, 234 Neb. 307, 308, 450 N.W.2d 696, 697 (1990).
109. E.g., State v. Green, 238 Neb. 328, 343-44, 470 N.W.2d 736, 749 (1991)(quoting
Clontz v. Jensen, 227 Neb. 191, 196, 416 N.W.2d 577, 580 (1987)); Pollard v. Jensen,
222 Neb. 521, 523, 384 N.W.2d 640, 641-42 (1986)(citation omitted).
110. State v. Deets, 234 Neb. 307, 308, 450 N.W.2d 696, 697 (1990). The court did recog-
nize that it would be improper for the officer to intimidate the motorist into tak-
ing the test by representing that the penalty for refusal is much greater than it
actually is. Id. at 308-09, 450 N.W.2d at 697.
111. 212 Neb. 168, 322 N.W.2d 386 (1982).
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stand what he was being asked to do. Likewise, in Wiseman v. Sulli-
van,112 the court found the motorist's refusal to be justifiable because
the officer had co-mingled the Miranda warnings and the implied con-
sent warnings to the point that the motorist justifiably believed he had
the right to consult an attorney before submitting to a blood test.
5. Chemical Test Results - Establishing Failure
If all of the above prerequisites to a valid request to submit to a
chemical test are established, then the litigants may address the fun-
damental issue of whether the motorist actually refused or failed a
chemical test."13 If a test has actually been administered, then the in-
quiry is whether the test accurately indicates an alcohol concentration
in excess of statutory limnits.114
Two avenues are available to the motorist to attack the chemical
test results. First, the licensee may try to keep the test results from
being admitted into evidence. If successful, the license of the motorist
cannot be administratively revoked. Even if there is other evidence
that the motorist was intoxicated, such evidence is not relevant at this
point in the administrative hearing. Only failure of a chemical test or
refusal can trigger administrative action. If the test results are admit-
ted into evidence, the defendant can challenge the reliability of the
particular test based on some irregularity in the circumstances. This
approach is much less effective, however, as it may be difficult for the
fact finder to ignore such "scientific" results.
The admissibility of chemical test results in an administrative fo-
rum was not an issue before the passage of LB 291. Under the previ-
ous statutory scheme, there was no need to consider this question
because the administrative revocation process was triggered only
when a motorist refused to submit to a chemical test."35 As a result,
though the law concerning the admissibility of chemical tests in a
criminal prosecution has been litigated extensively, the requirements
for admissibility in an administrative hearing are not clear.
112. 190 Neb. 724, 729, 211 N.W.2d 906, 910 (1973).
113. It should be noted that a preliminary breath test is not a "chemical test" which
triggers the administrative revocation process. The preliminary breath test takes
place before the motorist is arrested and is used to establish probable cause for
arrest. See State v. Green, 217 Neb. 70, 73-74, 348 N.W.2d 429, 431-32 (1984).
114. By statute, it is unlawful for a person to operate a motor vehicle,
(b) When such person has a concentration of ten-hundredths of one
gram or more by weight of alcohol per one hundred milliliters of his or
her blood; or
(c) When such person has a concentration of ten-hundredths of one
gram or more by weight of alcohol per two hundred ten liters of his or
her breath.
LB 291 § 4(1); NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-669-07(1)(Cum. Supp. 1992).
115. NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-669.15 (Reissue 1988)(amended1992).
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In criminal prosecutions, the basic requirements for admissibility
are prescribed by statute. The Legislature has provided that, in order
to be valid, chemical tests are to be performed according to methods
approved by the Department of Health and by an individual possess-
ing a valid permit issued by the Department for such a purpose.116
These requirements work both for and against the motorist. On the
one hand, the statute sets forth minimum requirements for admissibil-
ity which the motorist can utilize to oppose admission of the test re-
sults. On the other hand, the statute provides that tests performed in
accordance with this section "shall be competent evidence," effectively
foreclosing a challenge to the adequacy of the established
procedures.117
Under the rules of evidence, which are always in force in a crimi-
nal proceeding, the courts have applied an additional set of admissibil-
ity requirements which largely parallel the above statutory
requirements. In such an instance, the State must lay a fairly detailed
foundation before the test results may be admitted. In regard to
breath test results, the State must satisfy four foundational elements:
1) that the testing device was properly working at the time of testing;
2) that the person administering the test was qualified and held a valid
permit; 3) that the test was properly conducted under the methods
stated by the Department of Health; and 4) that all other statutes
were satisfied.118 Foundation evidence to this effect is also required to
admit the results of blood tests.11 9
The courts have been relatively strict in the application of the
above requirements. To lay the proper foundation, the State must
116. LB 291 § 6; NEB. REv. STAT. § 39-669.11 (Cum. Supp. 1992) provides:
Any test made under section 39-669.08, if made in conformity with
the requirements of this section, shall be competent evidence in any
prosecution under a state statute or city or village ordinance involving
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcoholic liquor
or drugs or involving driving or being in actual physical control of a mo-
tor vehicle when the concentration of alcohol in the blood or breath is in
excess of allowable levels.
To be considered valid, tests of blood, breath, or urine made under
section 39-669.08 shall be performed according to methods approved by
the Department of Health and by an individual possessing a valid permit
issued by such department for such purpose ....
117. See State v. Tatara, 230 Neb. 279, 282, 430 N.W.2d 692, 695 (1988)(citing Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 39-669.11 and holding that test results obtained in conformance with § 39-
669.11 are admissible). See also State v. Kudlacek, 229 Neb. 297, 300-01; 426
N.W.2d 289, 292 (1988) (holding that the motorist may not challenge the accuracy
of devices used to calibrate the testing devices as "[s]uch a chain of evidence
might have to proceed ad infinitum.").
118. State v. Bullock, 223 Neb. 182, 183-84, 388 N.W.2d 505, 507 (1986); State v. Gerber,
206 Neb. 75, 90-91, 291 N.W.2d 403, 411-12 (1980). See also State v. Obermeier, 241
Neb. 802, 490 N.W.2d 693 (1992)(holding that actual copy of testing permit need
not be introduced).
119. State v. Brittain, 212 Neb. 686, 690-92, 325 N.W.2d 141, 146 (1982).
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provide specific evidence that the testing device was in proper working
order such as a maintenance and/or calibration log. Specific evidence,
including a Department of Health permit, is also required to establish
that the person administering the test is qualified. Furthermore, it
appears to be necessary for the State to offer in evidence the Depart-
ment of Health rules and regulations and offer specific evidence of
compliance with the methods prescribed in those rules.12 0 A defi-
ciency in any one of these areas may render the test results inadmissi-
ble under the rules of evidence.
As discussed above, it is not at all clear how or even if these rules
apply in an administrative setting. The rules and regulations promul-
gated by the Department of Motor Vehicles do not directly address
this issue. The regulations provide that receipt of the officer's sworn
report is sufficient to establish a prima facie case for the Depart-
ment.12 1 In addition, when the rules of evidence have not been in-
voked, the regulations direct the hearing officer to admit evidence
which possesses probative value "in any form commonly accepted by
reasonably prudent persons in the conduct of their affairs."122 Based
on these provisions, it appears that the regulations allow the Depart-
ment to establish a prima facie case for revocation simply by including
the test results in the sworn report, provided a "reasonably prudent"
person would accept the test results in such a form.
A more detailed evidentiary showing may be required by statute,
however. Section 39-669.11 provides that chemical tests must be per-
formed according to methods approved by the Department of Health
in order "[t]o be considered valid."123 This language arguably compels
the State to make some showing of compliance with these methods in
order for the test results to be admitted. Resolution of the question
depends primarily on whether a reasonably prudent person would ac-
cept chemical test results where there has been no showing of compli-
ance with the statutory validity requirements.
In response to the above, it may be argued that § 39-669.11 applies
only to "prosecution[s] under a state statute," which may not include
an administrative appeal.=4 Though this argument is persuasive, it
does not settle the question. There is at least room for argument that
the "prosecution" limitation applies only to the first paragraph of the
120. State v. Dail, 228 Neb. 653, 661, 424 N.W.2d 99, 105 (1988); State v. Bullock, 223
Neb. 182, 183-84, 388 N.W.2d 505, 507 (1986); State v. Green, 217 Neb. 70, 73-74, 348
N.W.2d 429, 431-32 (1984); State v. Dush, 214 Neb. 51, 54, 332 N.W.2d 679, 681-82
(1983); State v. Gerber, 206 Neb. 75, 90-91, 291 N.W.2d 403, 411-12 (1980).
121. 247 NEB. ADMIN. R. & REGs. Chap. 1, § 6.05B (1993)(Dept. of Motor Vehicles).
122. Id § 19.01. This evidentiary standard matches that contained in the Administra-
tive Procedure Act. NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-914(1)(Reissue 1987).
123. LB 291 § 6; NEB. REv. STAT. § 36-669.11 (Cur. Supp. 1992). The relevant portions
of the statute are reproduced above. See supra note 116.
124. Id
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statute. Arguably, the validity language in the second paragraph of
the statute has application beyond criminal prosecutions to provide
minimum standards for all chemical tests performed pursuant to § 39-
669.08.
If the rules of evidence are in force, the question of the applicabil-
ity of § 39-669.11 is of less importance. In such a case, the hearing of-
ficer must look to the relatively strict foundational requirements that
have been applied by the courts in criminal prosecutions.1 25 These re-
quirements would appear to have equal force in an administrative set-
ting and, as discussed above, necessitate a detailed evidentiary showing
in order to establish a prima facie case for revocation.1 26
If a challenge to the admissibility of the test results fails, the mo-
torist's remaining option is to attack the reliability of the test results
in an attempt to sway the finder of fact.127 Though there are countless
methods to attack reliability, a few of the most obvious techniques
merit discussion.
The most straightforward method to challenge the test results is to
introduce independent test results. By statute, the motorist has the
right to an independent chemical test performed by a physician of his
or her choice.128 In addition, the physician may evaluate the motor-
ist's condition and perform any laboratory tests deemed appropri-
ate.129 By taking advantage of this right, the motorist may be able to
refute the test results or at least gather evidence as to a physical condi-
tion that could affect the test.13 0 Many motorists are not aware of this
provision, however, and law enforcement officers are not required to
advise them of this right.13 1 In addition, time is the enemy of the mo-
125. See supra text accompanying notes 118-19.
126. Id
127. Though the basic requirements for admissibility are provided by statute, the
courts have held that it is beyond the power of the Legislature to prescribe that
certain evidence is conclusive and binding on the courts. State v. Burling, 224
Neb. 725, 730, 400 N.W.2d 872, 876 (1987).
128. NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-669.09 (Cum. Supp. 1992) provides:
The person tested shall be permitted to have a physician of his or her
choice evaluate his or her condition and perform or have performed
whatever laboratory tests he or she deems appropriate in addition to and
following the test or tests administered at the direction of the law en-
forcement officer. If the officer refuses to permit such additional test to
be taken, then the original test or tests shall not be competent as evi-
dence. Upon the request of the person tested, the results of the test or
tests taken at the direction of the law enforcement officer shall be made
available to him or her.
129. Id.
130. Though the courts have not dealt specifically with the issue, it appears that a
motorist's independent test results would have to comply with the same admissi-
bility requirements as the official chemical test results.
131. State v. Klingelhoefer, 222 Neb. 219, 225, 382 N.W.2d 366, 370 (1986); State v.
Miller, 213 Neb. 274, 276, 328 N.W.2d 769, 771 (1983).
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torist in this situation. If the independent tests are not conducted very
soon after the official tests, they lack probative value as to the motor-
ist's condition while he or she was driving.
The element of time raises another area in which the official test
results can be challenged. Recognizing the link between testing delay
and the probative value of the results, the courts have held that the
chemical test must be given within a "reasonable time" after the mo-
torist was apprehended.1 32 Given the fact that a delay in time may
actually work in the defendant's favor, however, a delay of up to an
hour has been rather routinely allowed.133
Another approach that has been used with some success is to at-
tack the testing device or procedure to establish a margin of error. In
State v. Burling,134 the defendant offered expert testimony that the
distribution of alcohol in the breath varies from person to person so
that the standard ratio used by the machine was subject to a margin of
error. The court held that a test subject to a margin of error must be
adjusted so as to give the defendant the benefit of the doubt.135 The
court has limited the holding in Burling, however, stating that a mar-
gin of error cannot exist as a matter of law, but must be established in
each case independently of prior cases.13 6
6. Actions Constituting Refusal
If it has been established that there was a valid request to submit to
a chemical test, but the motorist did not actually submit to the test,
the final inquiry is whether the actions of the motorist constituted a
refusal within the meaning of the statute. This is not a new issue in
the administrative forum as an operator's license could be administra-
tively revoked for refusal under the previous statutory scheme. As a
result, there has been a substantial amount of litigation in Nebraska
concerning the question of just what actions and/or responses by a mo-
torist constitute a refusal to submit to a chemical test. The issue has
been considered in the context of administrative license revocation
proceedings and in regard to criminal charges for refusal.13 7
132. State v. Kubik, 235 Neb. 612, 634, 456 N.W.2d 487, 501 (1990).
133. Id.
134. 224 Neb. 725, 400 N.W.2d 872 (1987).
135. Id. at 730, 400 N.W.2d at 876. See also State v. Hvistendahl, 225 Neb. 315, 318, 405
N.W.2d 273, 276 (1987).
136. State v. Babcock, 227 Neb. 649, 653, 419 N.W.2d 527, 530 (1988).
137. As noted earlier, a preliminary breath test is not a chemical test subject to admin-
istrative revocation procedures. See supra, note 113. This distinction is also rele-
vant in the area of refusal. Refusal to submit to a preliminary breath test is a
separate offense from refusal to submit to a chemical test and occurs before,
rather than after, arrest. Under LB 291, a person who refuses to submit to a
preliminary breath test is guilty of a Class V misdemeanor and may be placed
under arrest. LB 291 § 5(3), NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-669.08(3)(Cum. Supp. 1992). If,
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Though its application is sometimes difficult, the law concerning
refusals is well settled. One passage in particular is quoted by the Ne-
braska Supreme Court in almost every case of this type. The court
states:
A refusal to submit to a chemical test occurs within the meaning of the im-
plied consent law when the licensee, after being asked to submit to a test, so
conducts himself as to justify a reasonable person in the requesting officer's
position in believing that the licensee understood that he was being asked to
submit to a test and manifested an unwillingness to take it.1 3 8
As has been shown to be common in this area of the law, the courts'
application of this "objective" test tends to favor the State. First of all,
the courts have emphasized that the above standard is based on a rea-
sonable officer's perception of the situation. This focus on the percep-
tion of the officer seemingly applies without regard to the actual
condition of the motorist. In Wohigemuth v. Pearson,1 3 9 the court
considered whether a motorist who had been in an accident and suf-
fered a concussion was capable of refusal. In fact, there was evidence
that the motorist was not entirely coherent after the accident. The
court deferred to the officer's perception and found a refusal, how-
ever, finding that "any other result would force the director and the
trial court into a psychological guessing game as to the appellee's state
of mind and his degree of capability of comprehension." 40
In addition, the courts have not tolerated any type of conditional
response by the motorist. "Anything less than an unqualified, une-
quivocal assent to an officer's request to submit to a chemical test con-
stitutes a refusal."41 Under this approach, the motorist may not
condition submission to a test on consultation with an attorney 42 or
refuse based on concerns about the effect that medication or subse-
quent alcohol ingestion may have on the test.143 Furthermore, the
motorist is allowed only one chance to consent. A motorist who re-
fuses, then changes his or her mind and consents, has still refused
under the statute and the officer need not administer the test. 4 4
at that point, there is other evidence to support the officer's suspicion, the defend-
ant may be arrested for driving under the influence and asked to submit to an
actual chemical test.
138. E.g., State v. Green, 238 Neb. 328, 343, 470 N.W.2d 736, 749 (1991); State v. Clark,
229 Neb. 103, 108, 425 N.W.2d 347, 351 (1988); Clontz v. Jensen, 227 Neb. 191, 196,
416 N.W.2d 577, 580 (1987).
139. 204 Neb. 687, 285 N.W.2d 102 (1979),
140. Id. at 691, 285 N.W.2d at 104. See also Jensen v. Jensen, 222 Neb. 23, 382 N.W.2d 9
(1986) (deferring to the finder of fact when considering conflicting evidence as to
the motorist's coherency).
141. E.g., Clontz v. Jensen, 227 Neb. 191, 195, 416 N.W.2d 577, 580 (1987).
142. Id. at 195, 416 N.W.2d 580.
143. Bapat v. Jensen, 220 Neb. 763, 765, 371 N.W.2d 742, 745 (1985); Rudat v. Pearson,
202 Neb. 331, 333-34, 275 N.W.2d 279, 280-81 (1979).
144. Hoyle v. Peterson, 216 Neb. 253, 256, 343 N.W.2d 730, 733 (1984)("In a driver's
course through the implied consent law, there comes a 'point of no return.' After
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Even where the motorist has claimed to be physically unable to
complete the test, the courts have been reluctant to exonerate the li-
censee. While recognizing that a true physical disability may excuse
conduct that would otherwise be treated as a refusal, the courts have
narrowly interpreted this exception.1 45
The court has also recognized the general idea of a "justifiable re-
fusal," but has likewise interpreted the exception narrowly. "Justifi-
able refusal of the test depends upon some illegal or unreasonable
aspect in the nature of the request, the test itself, or both."146 Such a
general statement has the potential for liberal application, but the
courts have been reluctant to find that a refusal was justifiable. In
fact, they have so held in only two cases where it was very clear that
the defendant's actions were reasonable under the circumstances. 147
As such, each of the substantive issues which may be raised in an
administrative hearing under LB 291 has already been addressed by
the courts to some degree. In light of the fact that the case law in this
area tends to favor the State, it will be difficult for an intoxicated mo-
torist to avoid revocation by arguing a substantive issue.
D. Procedural Issues
As would be expected with any new statutory scheme of adminis-
trative adjudication, there are a myriad of unanswered questions con-
cerning the specific procedures that will be followed under ALR.
Some of these questions were answered when the Department of Mo-
tor Vehicles promulgated the rules and regulations that govern the
process.148 Other questions will not be answered until the system has
been in place for some time. Though it would be impossible to antici-
pate and discuss all of these issues, there are a few major topics that
warrant discussion.
a reasonable opportunity to make a decision has been afforded a motorist, a deci-
sion simply has to be made."). But see Sedlacek v. Pearson, 204 Neb. 625, 628, 284
N.W.2d 556, 557-58 (1979)(holding that a motorist who refuses and then changes
his mind may not be cited for refusal if a chemical test was actually
administered).
145. State v. Clark, 229 Neb. 103, 109, 425 N.W.2d 347, 351-52 (1988).
146. Hoyle v. Peterson, 216 Neb. 253, 256, 343 N.W.2d 730, 733 (1984).
147. Martinez v. Peterson, 212 Neb. 168,322 N.W.2d 386 (1982)(holding that the motor-
ist's refusal was justifiable because he did not speak English and could not under-
stand what he was being asked to do); Wiseman v. Sullivan, 190 Neb. 724, 211
N.W.2d 906 (1973)(holding that the motorist's refusal was justifiable because the
officer had co-mingled the Miranda warnings and the implied consent warnings
to the point that the motorist justifiably believed he had the right to an attorney
before submitting to a blood test).
148. Rules and regulations were approved in their final form and filed with the Secre-
tary of State on February 24, 1993. 247 NEB. ADmiN. R. & REGS. Chap. 1
(1993) (Dept. of Motor Vehicles).
1993]
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1. Burden of Proof
Probably the most important procedural issue is the question of
who must bear the burden of proof in the administrative hearing.
Must the State establish that a revocation order is proper, or must the
motorist establish that the proposed order is improper? The language
of the statute does not directly address the issue. The Department of
Motor Vehicles has adopted the position that the burden of proof is on
the motorist to show by a preponderance of the evidence why his or
her license should not be revoked.149 The State, however, must estab-
lish a prima facie case for revocation by offering the officer's sworn
report.1 5 0
This approach appears to be in accord with the case law on the
subject. In Mackey v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles,151 the court considered
the burden of proof in a refusal hearing. The court stated:
[S]ection 39-669.15, R.R.S. 1943, by prescribing the contents of the affidavit
which the arresting officer must file with the Director of Motor Vehicles after
a person refuses to submit to a sobriety test, places the burden upon the State
to make a prima facie case for revocation before the Director.1 5 2
As amended by LB 291, section 39-669.15 still prescribes the contents
of the sworn report which is to be forwarded to the Director of the
Department of Motor Vehicles.153 As such, it appears that this section
can also be interpreted to place the burden of a prima facie showing on
the State.
The remaining question is whether the State may actually estab-
lish its prima facie case simply by offering the officer's sworn report.
Where the rules of evidence have been invoked, it is relatively clear
that the State must do more. Competent evidence must be offered to
establish the prerequisites to a valid request to submit to a chemical
test and to establish refusal or failure of the test.154 In fact, the regu-
lations anticipate such a result by placing the burden of going forward
on the Department in hearings under the formal rules of evidence. 5 5
Even where the rules of evidence are not requested, however, there is
some question as to whether the sworn report alone is sufficient to
establish the prima facie case.156
2. Officer Actions
The critical role played by law enforcement officers in the imple-
149. 247 NEB. ADMIN. R. & REGS. Chap. 1, § 6 (1993)(Dept. of Motor Vehicles).
150. Id
151. 194 Neb. 707, 235 N.W.2d 394 (1975).
152. Id. at 712, 235 N.W,2d at 397.
153. LB 291 § 9(2)-(3); NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-669.15(2)-(3)(Cum. Supp. 1992).
154. See supra text accompanying notes 74-147.
155. 247 NEB. ADMIN. R. & REGS. Chap. 1, § 15.02A (1993)(Dept. of Motor Vehicles).
156. See supra text accompanying notes 121-24.
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mentation of ALR also raises a number of procedural issues. Though
there are many questions, clear answers will not be available until the
ALR system has been in place for some time. Nonetheless, it is useful
to at least raise two main questions at this point in time.
The first issue involves the officer's involvement at the time of the
arrest. In short, how far can the officer deviate from the statutory
requirements? For instance, after seizing the motorist's license, the
officer is to forward a sworn report to the Director.157 What if the
sworn report is incomplete? May the defect be cured by officer testi-
mony at the hearing or is an order based on a defective report void?
Furthermore, what are the requirements for establishing that the re-
port is "sworn"? In resolving these questions, the Department of Mo-
tor Vehicles and the courts must seek to achieve the purpose of the
statutes while maintaining the scheme's somewhat tenuous hold on
due process.
The second major issue involves the officer's involvement in the
administrative hearing. Though the officer must appear at the hear-
ing, 58 it is not clear how much latitude the officer will be allowed in
giving his or her testimony. Particularly where the rules of evidence
are in force, difficult questions arise as to the propriety of the officer's
testimony. For instance, if the arresting officer did not actually ad-
minister the chemical test, may he or she testify concerning the ad-
ministration of the test, or must the technician be called to testify? If
it is necessary to call the technician as a witness, the burden ALR
places on law enforcement resources increases dramatically. Resolu-
tion of such relatively obscure issues will have a significant impact on
the overall efficiency of ALR in Nebraska.
3. Appeal in District Court
a. Perfecting the Appeal
Pursuant to the provisions of the APA, persons "aggrieved" by a
revocation order of the Director may appeal in district court. In gen-
eral, there is nothing unusual about the procedure for perfecting the
appeal. In the area of service, however, there is one major trap for the
unwary.
Under the APA,159 summons is to be served in the manner pro-
vided for service of summons in a civil case. The potential trap lies in
the manner in which a state agency is properly served. By statute, the
State of Nebraska, any state agency or any employee of the State sued
in an official capacity may be served by leaving the summons at the
Office of the Attorney General with the Attorney General, Deputy
157. LB 291 § 9(2)-(3); NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-669.15(2)-(3)(Cum. Supp. 1992).
158. 247 NEB. ADMIN. R. & REGS. Chap. 1, § 17.02 (1993)(Dept. of Motor Vehicles).
159. NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-917(2)(a)(Cum. Supp. 1992).
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Attorney General or someone designated in writing by the Attorney
General.160
If a party aggrieved by an order of the Director of the Department
of Motor Vehicles files an appeal in district court, but serves the De-
partment of Motor Vehicles rather than the Office of the Attorney
General, the jurisdiction of the district court may be subject to chal-
lenge. The argument that the court lacks jurisdiction is based on Neb.
Const. art. V, § 22. The section provides: "[T]he State may sue and be
sued, and the Legislature shall provide by law in what manner and in
what court suits shall be brought." Based on this language, it is argua-
ble that the only proper method for service on the State is a method
provided by statute.
Continuing this argument, the only statutory method for service on
the State is that contained in § 25-510.02 which provides for service
upon the Attorney General. Support for this view is found in Beatrice
Manor, Inc. v. Department of Health,161 where the court noted that
§ 25-510.02 made service on the Attorney General a requirement for
all cases involving the State. As such, there is a persuasive argument
that service must be made upon the Attorney General. Though it is
not clear if the courts will universally accept this argument, by far the
safest path for the motorist is to serve both the Department of Motor
Vehicles and the Attorney General.
b. Temporary Stay of Revocation Order
Under the provisions of the APA,162 the motorist may request that
the Department of Motor Vehicles stay the revocation order pending
the district court's ruling. If the Department of Motor Vehicles re-
fuses to do so, such a temporary stay may also be requested from the
court. The court may not grant such relief unless it finds that all of
the following criteria are met: 1) the motorist is likely to prevail in the
action; 2) the motorist will suffer irreparable injuries if a stay is not
granted; 3) the grant of a stay will not substantially harm other parties
to the proceedings; and 4) the threat to public health relied upon by
the Department is not sufficiently serious to justify the Department's
denial of a temporary stay.163
Though these criteria appear to be rigorous, they have not been so
applied by the courts. In the context of judicial review of refusal hear-
ings, temporary stays have been issued by the courts almost as a mat-
ter of course. The ready availability of the temporary stay makes the
district court appeal a more attractive option. A motorist who cannot
160. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-510.02 (Reissue 1989).
161. 219 Neb. 141, 144, 362 N.W.2d 45, 49 (1985).
162. NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-917(3)(Cum. Supp. 1992).
163. Id.
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decide whether or not to appeal may be swayed in favor of appeal if
the loss of his or her license will thereby be postponed.
In fact, the manner in which the courts handle temporary stays
could have a huge impact on the overall effectiveness of ALR. If tem-
porary stays are awarded as a matter of course, the courts may be
flooded with appeals and the efficiency of ALR will break down to
some degree. If the courts become stingier with temporary stays, mo-
torists may be less likely to appeal and ALR will indeed provide swift
punishment.
The potential increase in caseload may actually encourage the
courts to take a closer look at temporary stays. For the judge who is
concerned about such a burden, the statutory criteria provide ample
grounds upon which to deny a temporary stay in all but a few cases.
c. Standard of Review and Burden of Proof
In district court, the standard of review to be applied is "de novo on
the record of the agency."1 64 Under a de novo review, the court makes
independent findings of fact and conclusions of law based on the evi-
dence that was before the agency.1 65 Though in no way bound by the
findings of the lower tribunal, where there is a conflict in the evi-
dence, the court will give weight to the fact that the hearing officer
saw, heard, and observed the witnesses.1 66
As the district court is acting as an appellate court, no new evi-
dence may be offered by the parties.1 67 Evidence that was objected to
in the administrative hearing may be challenged, however. If the
court determines that evidence was improperly admitted, such evi-
dence will not be considered by the court in its de novo review. Like-
wise, if the court determines that evidence was improperly excluded,
such evidence may be considered.168
Though the court makes a finding independent of the Director, the
burden of proof at the district court level clearly falls on the motorist.
The motorist must establish by a preponderance of the evidence the
grounds for reversal of the Director's order.169 Thus, the district court
164. NEB. REv. STAT. § 84-917(5)(a)(Cum. Supp. 1992).
165. Haeffner v. State, 220 Neb. 560, 568, 371 N.W.2d 658, 663 (1985)(Shanahan, J., con-
curring)("A de novo review by this court necessarily includes finding and weigh-
ing facts anew.").
166. Clontz v. Jensen, 227 Neb. 191, 193, 416 N.W.2d 577, 579 (1987); Jensen v. Jensen,
222 Neb. 23, 26, 382 N.W.2d 9, 11 (1986).
167. Dairyland Power v. State Bd. of Equalization, 238 Neb. 696, 701-06, 472 N.W.2d
363, 367-69 (1991).
168. Fremont Nat'l Bank v. Beerbohm, 223 Neb. 657, 662, 392 N.W.2d 767, 771
(1986)("Just as in a de novo review on the record this court will not consider
improperly admitted evidence, it will consider improperly excluded evi-
dence.") (citations omitted).
169. E.g., Jamros v. Jensen, 221 Neb. 426, 429, 377 N.W.2d 119, 122 (1985).
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appeal represents somewhat of a tradeoff for the motorist. The motor-
ist gains a complete review of the Director's order, but must earn such
a review by bearing the burden of proof.
V. FUTURE CHANGES IN NEBRASKA DRUNK DRIVING
LAW
The implementation of ALR is by no means the final step in the
evolution of drunk driving law in Nebraska. In addition to refining
the ALR process, the Nebraska Legislature is likely to implement a
number of substantial changes in the near future. In fact, a number of
changes have already received the attention of the Legislature.170
Probably the most significant change under discussion is a reduc-
tion in the legal blood alcohol level from .10 percent to .08 percent. A
number of other states have already adopted a level of .08 percent and
such a reduction is required to continue to qualify for the federal in-
centive programs.171
More novel approaches have also been considered. Under one pro-
posal, courts would be authorized to require persons on probation for
driving under the influence to install ignition interlock devices in
their vehicles. 172 With such a device in place, a vehicle cannot be
started unless the driver's breath is free of alcohol.
Another proposal would impose a zero-tolerance blood alcohol
level on motorists under the age of twenty-one. Under such a provi-
sion, a minor operating a vehicle while having a blood alcohol level
greater than .02 percent would be guilty of driving while intoxicated
or subject to license revocation.17 3
Other significant proposals include seizing the drunken motorist's
license plates and registration, increased use of roadside sobriety
checkpoints, and use of video equipment to record erratic driving,
drunken behavior, and failure of field sobriety tests. 74 As such, the
legislative debate over how best to prevent drunk driving will likely
resume during the next session of the Legislature and continue for a
number of years to come.
VI. CONCLUSION
LB 291 represents the most significant piece of drunk driving legis-
lation to be enacted in Nebraska in over twenty years. To implement
a comprehensive system of administrative license revocation, the new
statutory scheme establishes a separate administrative forum as the
170. See LR 84, supra note 8, at 54-65.
171. Id. at 60-61, 70.
172. Id. at 54, 148-52.
173. Id. at 164-66.
174. Id. at 54-65.
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focal point for "swift and certain" license revocation. Despite these
significant changes, the substantive law to be applied in the new fo-
rum is relatively settled and tends to favor the State. From a proce-
dural standpoint, the law concerning ALR is much less settled and a
number of questions remain unanswered.
Only time will tell whether the Legislature's latest efforts to deter
Nebraskans from drinking and driving prove effective. It is clear,
however, that the implementation of ALR marks a new beginning
point, rather than an ending point, in the fight against drunk driving.
A long line of additional proposals await the consideration of the Leg-
islature. At some point, it seems, the statutory provisions in this area
will become so ominous that no one will drink and drive. Until that
point is reached, however, enforcement efforts will continue and the
law in this area will become increasingly complex.
Timothy L. Moll '94
